I've been trying to understand both sides of this argument, and for the life of me it just seems to come down to the Dems willingly allowing themselves to be outspinned. Maybe there's something I'm missing--if so, someone fill it in for me--but when Dick Durbin, a guy who voted against the original war authorization, gets on the Senate floor and says that he can't vote against this bill because it will hurt the troops, I'm just flabbergasted. How is insisting that we bring the troops home from an unwinnable war hurting the troops? How is postponing the inevitable not hurting the troops? Why do the Dems get the blame but the president's veto is not seen as blameworthy?
How does an unpopular, discredited, weakened president at a time when most of the country has turned against his war win this argument? Someone correct me if I'm wrong, but that the Dems allowed the vote on this bill to be framed in such a way that voting No was a vote to hurt the troops seems to me to be the height of political inanity. How is it that at this juncture the pro-war faction still has such power to frame the terms of the debate?
I don't buy the argument that setting a timetable is poor military strategy. Whether we set one or just decide precipitously to withdraw, it's going to be a mess either way. And we're going to have to do one or the other sooner or later, so why not sooner? If it's later, as it was in Vietnam, when that day comes, we'll look back to May of '07 and ask ourselves why we let this horror drag out so long. What did we gain from doing so? How many more lives and billions of dollars will we waste during that time? Why didn't congress stand up to the president?
I understand the argument that the Dems didn't have the votes to overturn the veto. I understand the cynical political calculation that it favors the Dems to keep letting the president and the GOP own the war. I understand that it would have required some political discipline on the part of the Dems not to blink in what would have been a tough game of chicken with the president. But why is the assumption that this weakened president would have won?
Update: I just came across this comment by rogerwg at TPM Cafe. It makes my point about timetables and their consequences a little more clearly:
The problem is, of course, the idea that it is better to drift than to plan a withdrawal. In actuality, if you don't plan how to play an endgame, it will play you. The only way that you can almost guarantee a withdrawal disaster is if you don't plan the withdrawal over a significant period of time. A year is a pretty good marker. That is why the capitulation was and is such a disaster - it was a vote for drift. The bill's design, with or without compulsory timetables, was actually the only way that a withdrawal can be effected that won't be a disaster. Drift has already had a terrible effect on making U.S. territory unsafe - the danger coming, contra Bush, not from Iraqi Al Qaeda but from the humming camps in Pakistan, gathering money and recruits due to Iraq. Drift can't but have a disastrous effect on internal politics in Iraq - without any benchmarks, every side feels that they have most to gain by being most intransigent. And, of course, by not planning the withdrawal long before it happens, the drift strategy all but asks that withdrawal be forced upon us. It is like the pro-war people think that end of this war will be a nice surprise party - hey, we love you americans, here are some bases for you to stay on and attack our neigbhors, who of course happen to be closely connected to our leadership, and we are going to have a ticker tape parade, with flowers and candies, as you march home.
So: the war will end, and if you don't plan the end of the American participation in the war, you are inviting anarchy and a disastrous exit.
Those who don't want us to 'discuss" withdrawing are like superstitious people who don't want to mention death in a sick room - or call the doctor. They are, in other words, irrational cowards. Hitching a war strategy to them is a bad bad idea.
It's all about jockeying for who's going to take the political blame for this fiasco; neither party is primarily concerned about what's best for the Iraqis or for the American troops.
Second Update: This from Greenwald Saturday morning that helps explains the illogic of Dick Durbin's justification of his Yes vote:
Is it any wonder that Americans reached the completely irrational conclusion that to de-fund the war is to endanger the troops? Not only were Dick Cheney and Joe Lieberman saying this, so, too, were most leading Democratic war opponents.
Thus, it was perfectly natural for Americans to assume that if virtually everyone -- including war opponents -- agreed that de-funding was the one measure that should not be considered, then there must be something truly dangerous and radical about it. Since virtually everyone rejected it as an option, it became toxic, and even most Americans who want an end to the war no matter how it is achieved turned against defunding.
So Alter is correct that Americans became convinced that de-funding constitutes troop abandonment. But that does not excuse what the Democrats did here, because the principal reason that Americans became convinced of that myth is because Democrats themselves embraced and propagated it. And now that myth lies cemented at the center of our political debate, and as a result, the most effective Congressional weapon for ending the war -- the one the Founders designed for that purpose -- has become politically radioactive, all based on a ludicrous notion that literally has no basis in reality.
This has long been the principal flaw of Democrats and it has not changed. They are both fearful and incapable of defending any position unless, from the outset, they are assured, by their conniving and principle-free consultants, that most Americans already agree with it. The idea of forcefully articulating a view in order to change public opinion -- such as explaining why de-funding is a perfectly valid option like all the others for ending the war -- never occurs to them.