think that I always suspected that my blindspot about the election was likely to come from my not being on social media--at all. I text with a few friends and family, and that's it. This blog hardly counts, at least if its immunity to virality is any measure.
I get most of my information from legacy media, not because I believe they're unbiased--there's no such thing as unbiased journalism. What stories get front-paged or buried, what facts get selected or filtered out, and then how those facts get interpreted are all deeply shaped by the biases, mostly unconscious, that derive from cultural presuppositions of the people who get hired for positions in the MSM. Those are presuppositions that I mostly do not share.
So there's no avoiding bias, but you can adjust for it. And I trust in the good-faith efforts of most journalists to respect journalistic standards for fact checking and fairness. No matter how imperfectly realized those standards are, they are in the information business, not the misinformation business. And If I'm particularly interested in something and want to go deeper, I read books by authors I have good reasons to trust.
Bottom line: I've got far more interesting things to do with my time than to waste it on social media, and that’s not gonna change. But I am just belatedly realizing how that makes it difficult for me to understand how deeply things have changed and are changing.
In a previous post I mentioned that the election results forced me to recognize that we were more far gone than I thought and hoped. By 'far gone' I meant many things that the phrase connotes, but mostly how far gone into our respective information and misinformation silos. I had not truly understood the degree to which social media has intensified this siloing.
I've read about it. Lots of people have been warning about it, but I just couldn't bring myself to believe that most Americans' annoyance with the Liberal Establishment could be so severe as to warrant restoring a guy to the Oval Office who is so obviously unfit. First time--ok, understandable. Protest vote. We hate the establishment. Let's teach it a lesson. Second time--after J6, after so many of his appointees who saw him up close reported how nuts he was, after all the courtroom losses? Surely, some of that will have broken through, right? Anybody but this guy, right? Well, clearly, I was wrong.
Does all that just no longer matter? I think it does, but I still believe that many (most?) Trump voters have no real understanding of it because of their having been siloed in information bubbles which prevented them from either finding out about it or just dismissing it as Liberal propaganda.
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It's already a cliche how social media has made running a democracy almost impossible, but this quote from Jonathan Haidt's 2022 article "Why the Past 10 Years of American Life Have Been Uniquely Stupid" helpful sums it up nicely:
Recent academic studies suggest that social media is indeed corrosive to trust in governments, news media, and people and institutions in general. A working paper that offers the most comprehensive review of the research, led by the social scientists Philipp Lorenz-Spreen and Lisa Oswald, concludes that “the large majority of reported associations between digital media use and trust appear to be detrimental for democracy.” The literature is complex—some studies show benefits, particularly in less developed democracies—but the review found that, on balance, social media amplifies political polarization; foments populism, especially right-wing populism; and is associated with the spread of misinformation....
The former CIA analyst Martin Gurri predicted these fracturing effects in his 2014 book, The Revolt of the Public. Gurri’s analysis focused on the authority-subverting effects of information’s exponential growth, beginning with the internet in the 1990s. Writing nearly a decade ago, Gurri could already see the power of social media as a universal solvent, breaking down bonds and weakening institutions everywhere it reached. He noted that distributed networks “can protest and overthrow, but never govern.” He described the nihilism of the many protest movements of 2011 that organized mostly online and that, like Occupy Wall Street, demanded the destruction of existing institutions without offering an alternative vision of the future or an organization that could bring it about.
In other words, it's not that the Biden administration did such a terrible job. It can be argued that his administration was among the most effective in American history in achieving what it did in such a polarized environment. And in such an environment, only the negative stories get legs. The Biden Administration made mistakes, as all administrations do, and those mistakes were consequential, but they got magnified by social media in ways that its accomplishments simply could not be.
But it goes deeper than that. It has to do with basic trust in institutions at a moment when the Liberal Order is in a slo-mo collapse. It's chief symptom is our lack of any shared, coherent understanding of or sense of shared values, shared history, or any shared picture regarding what it means to be American. How can a democracy survive if that's the case? Haidt goes on--
When people lose trust in institutions, they lose trust in the stories told by those institutions. That’s particularly true of the institutions entrusted with the education of children. History curricula have often caused political controversy, but Facebook and Twitter make it possible for parents to become outraged every day over a new snippet from their children’s history lessons––and math lessons and literature selections, and any new pedagogical shifts anywhere in the country. The motives of teachers and administrators come into question, and overreaching laws or curricular reforms sometimes follow, dumbing down education and reducing trust in it further. One result is that young people educated in the post-Babel era are less likely to arrive at a coherent story of who we are as a people, and less likely to share any such story with those who attended different schools or who were educated in a different decade.
There's no underlying shared mythos; there's nothing that binds us anymore as a people. Whoever tells the most compelling story wins, and in this moment, the stories told on social media that magnify the negativity, that rage on about the establishment's mistakes and that play to fantasies that stoke fear and grievance crowd out the stories about its accomplishments and competence.
And let's face it, the Liberal story, whatever its virtues, no longer works. It has become self-immolating. Haidt again--
Liberals in the late 20th century shared a belief that the sociologist Christian Smith called the “liberal progress” narrative, in which America used to be horrifically unjust and repressive, but, thanks to the struggles of activists and heroes, has made (and continues to make) progress toward realizing the noble promise of its founding. This story easily supports liberal patriotism, and it was the animating narrative of Barack Obama’s presidency. It is also the view of the “traditional liberals” in the “Hidden Tribes” study (11 percent of the population), who have strong humanitarian values, are older than average, and are largely the people leading America’s cultural and intellectual institutions.
But when the newly viralized social-media platforms gave everyone a dart gun, it was younger progressive activists who did the most shooting, and they aimed a disproportionate number of their darts at these older liberal leaders. Confused and fearful, the leaders rarely challenged the activists or their nonliberal narrative in which life at every institution is an eternal battle among identity groups over a zero-sum pie, and the people on top got there by oppressing the people on the bottom. This new narrative is rigidly egalitarian––focused on equality of outcomes, not of rights or opportunities. It is unconcerned with individual rights.
Most Democrat politicians, especially those accountable to constituencies back home, are not woke culture warriors. Most of them--at least in comparison to their GOP counterparts--are pragmatic problem solvers. This goes to what I was saying about Bernie in the post last week. Harris and Walz seemed to have understood this and were bending over backward to avoid enflaming culture war themes and to present themselves as pragmatic problem solvers, but that's not what got through. The Trump campaign found enough evidence to use in viral ads of Harris being a culture warrior to define her as one, and that's what stuck. It wasn't where she wanted to go that sank her, but where she came from.
I think this explains a big part of why voters in swing states that elected Democrats in statewide senatorial and gubernatorial races didn't vote for Harris. In many ways local politics have become nationalized, but not as much as advertised. As in the last two cycles, purple-state voters generally rejected crazy on the statewide ballots, even though they voted for it this time on the national ballot. Local elections are still about local candidates who understand local problems, while the national elections have become largely symbolic exercises that express the state of the American soul. Trump is simply a symptom of the country's soul sickness. He certainly isn't a cure for it.
It seems pretty clear that the Democrats as presently constituted are in their own way symptomatic of the disease. And as such neither do they offer a a cure. Something genuinely new has to emerge as an alternative. I believe it will. I'm just not sure when. Probably not in my lifetime.